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Is the Commercial Mass Media Necessary, or Even Desirable, for Liberal
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Neil Netanel*
As James Madison aptly put it:  “A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both.”1  In our day, certainly in the United States and to a growing extent in other
developed democracies, most citizens most of the time acquire popular information from
the commercial mass media.  It hasn’t always been that way and, perhaps, needn’t be that
way in the future.  In this essay, I ask whether the commercial media is the best vehicle
for gathering and distributing information and opinion to citizens of advanced liberal
democracies.
The role of commercial media in liberal democracy has been the subject of
renewed controversy in light of peer-to-to peer alternatives made possible by the Internet
and other digital communications technology.  I, and other commentators, have asserted
that, despite all their imperfections, the commercial media play and will continue to play
an important “Fourth Estate” role in liberal democratic governance.  Media critics have
countered that (1) liberal democratic governance would be better off if peer-to-peer
communications were to assume the primary role in the dissemination of information and
opinion and (2) digital communications makes that transition possible.
This paper seeks to push the ball forward on this issue.  Part I broadly outlines the
principal tenets of liberal democracy.  Part II describes the commercial media’s purported
“Fourth Estate” role and briefly notes the ways it falls short of realizing it.  Parts III and
IV limn two alternatives to the commercial media: political-party financed press and
government-funded media.  These Parts focus on the advantages and disadvantages of
those alternatives as compared to the commercial media.  Part V presents the proffered
alternative of peer-to-peer communication.  Part VI critiques that alternative.
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I. Liberal Democracy
“Liberal democracy” has multiple meanings and iterations.  One’s understanding
of “liberal democracy” can heavily color one’s view and expectations concerning the
desired role of the commercial media and its alternatives.2  Accordingly, I briefly outline
my understanding of “liberal democracy.”  In so doing, I build upon Ed Baker’s model of
“complex democracy,” as distinct from elitist, interest group pluralist, and republican
democracy.3  This model, I believe, captures the most salient common characteristics and
aspirations of advanced, developed-country democracies at the beginning of the twenty-
first century.
Liberal democracy presents numerous fault lines.  These include tensions between
individual autonomy and democratic process and between interest-group pluralism and
more republican notions of a common public good.  Contrary to the view of some
theorists, liberal democratic theory and practice incorporates and seeks to accommodate
all of those elements.4  It includes values and legal doctrine that highlight individual
autonomy, interest group pluralism, and common public discourse.  As Ed Baker puts it,
contrasting his model of “complex democracy” with interest group pluralism, civic
republicanism, and other unidimensional variants:  “A more ‘realistic’ theory would
assume that a participatory democracy would and should encompass arenas where both
individuals and groups look for and create common ground, that is, common goods, but
where they also advance their own individual and group values and interests.  Moreover,
normatively, it is difficult to argue that either type of political striving is inappropriate for
an ethical person or within a justifiable politics.”5
                                                
2 Ed Baker has convincingly detailed this point with respect to “democracy” and the media.  See C. Edwin
Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 317 (1998).
3 See id. at 335-43.
4 For a cogent refutation of the notion that rights-based liberalism is inherently hostile to democracy, see
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 29-36 (1995).
In addition, as Ed Rubin insightfully argues, the often overblown rhetoric of “rights” and “democracy” fails
to capture the essence of most government decision making in a modern “liberal democratic”
administrative state.  See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (2001).
5 Baker, supra note 2, at 336.
Significantly, and this is certainly the experience of liberal democratic nations,
complex democracy necessarily encompass multiple concentrations of power.  Interest
groups, civic associations, business firms, political parties, labor unions, and government
subdivisions and agencies vie and compete for power and influence in a wide variety of
arenas.6  The dispersion of power and consequent multiple concentrations of power are
both inevitable to and part of the fabric of a pluralist, liberal democracy.  They are part
and parcel of divided and limited government and of individual’s right and ability to
organize in common social, political, and commercial enterprise.
As I will discuss below, in designing a policy regarding the dissemination of
information and expression in a liberal democratic society, we must take account of both
the various values that comprise “complex democracy” and the fact of multiple
concentrations of political and economic power.  An information policy for liberal
democracy “properly includes a discursive search for common goods and agreement, but
it also must involve recognition of goods that are not common and about which there
must be fair bargaining and compromise.”7
II. The Commercial Media’s “Fourth Estate” Role
Echoing a widely held view of the role of the institutional press, I have argued
elsewhere that “liberal democracy requires an institutional media that possesses the
financial strength to reach a mass audience and engage in sustained investigative
reporting, free from a potentially corrupting dependence on state subsidy.”8  Underlying
that view is an understanding of the role that the commercial media plays in supporting
liberal democracy.  In acting as the “Fourth Estate,” the press is said to fulfill three basic
functions.  These are watchdog, public discourse facilitation, and trustworthy supplier of
information.
I use those three functions as the framework for our analysis.  I posit that liberal
democracy as I have described it requires some institution or institutions that serve those
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8 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1879, 1919 (2000).
functions.  Accordingly, I use the extent to which the commercial media and its
alternatives actually serve the functions as a vehicle for testing their relative desirability
for liberal democracy.  More particularly, I take the status quo– a system of free
expression dominated by the commercial media – as my starting point.  I take cognizance
of the abundant criticism of the commercial media and agree that the media imperfectly
serves as watchdog, public discourse facilitation, and trustworthy supplier of information
(though we may disagree on the extent to which the commercial media falls short of the
ideal).  But I then look at some leading alternatives, particular peer-to-peer
communication -- and ask whether they have performed or are likely to perform any
better.
I begin by outlining the three functions.  I first describe in their ideal form, the
way they are supposed to work.  I then briefly rehearse some of the ways in which the
commercial media fall short of this ideal.
A.  Watchdog
To the extent it fulfills the watchdog function, the commercial media catalyzes
and, to a degree, embodies public opinion in the face of both government authority and
private centers of power.  It serves to check the power -- and abuse of power -- of
government, business, political parties, interest groups, and associations.
The media acts as watchdog, first, by providing the public with information that
the public can then use to judge the politically and economically powerful.  Significantly
in that regard, the media engages in investigative reporting.9  It aggressively seeks out
information and scrutinizes those in positions of power, rather than merely acting as a
passive conduit for relaying the information given to it by the powerful.  Armed with that
information, the public can then vote out elected officials whom the press exposes as
incompetent, corrupt, or out-of-touch with majority views.  Citizens can also boycott or
otherwise organize against businesses or other associations that the press exposes as
unworthy (as those citizens would define it).  A prime, recent example is the reaction of
                                                
9 See, generally, DAVID L. PROTESS ET. AL., THE JOURNALISM OF OUTRAGE: INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA (1991).
the public and elected officials to media reporting of tobacco company executives’
perjurous denials that they long knew of nicotine’s addictive properties.10
In addition, the media fulfills its watchdog role by, in some sense, representing
the public before public and private officials.  Officials react to media reporting with the
assumption that it reflects public opinion.11  They also alter their conduct out of concern
for the possibility of that conduct coming under press scrutiny.  Thus, the mere presence
of the media helps check public and private power.  At times, of course, officials simply
try to cover-up illicit activity.  But overall the ever-present glare of the media gives
officials a strong incentive to desist from abuse of power.
B.  Public Discourse Facilitation
In addition to their watchdog function, media enterprises help to lay a foundation for
public discourse.  Liberal democratic governance requires some measure of public
discourse, some means for identifying issues of widespread concern and some forum for
confronting opposing perspectives.12  Individuals may have widely divergent interests
and preferences.  But democratic politics requires at least some shared understanding
about what are the most significant issues facing the polity as a whole.  And in that
regard, studies show that the public can focus only on a half a dozen or so issues at any
given time. 13  As a result, politics is not only about prevailing on contentious issues.  It
is, just as importantly, a struggle to place one’s favored issues on the public agenda.
The commercial media serve as conduits for discursive exchange.  But, of course,
they are not mere passive common carriers.  Rather, they present a forum for mediated
and edited deliberation and debate.  In so doing, the media both delimits a range of
                                                
10 See Netanel, supra note 8, at 1923-25 (discussing 60 Minutes interview with tobacco company whistle
blower Jeffrey Wigand).
11 See PROTESS ET. AL., supra note 9, at 244-49 (noting, on the basis of detailed case studies of investigative
reporting, that government officials tend to respond to investigative reporters and media exposés before
interest groups or the public take up the issue, treating the press as if it were the public).
12. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 186-87 (1997) (contending that
liberal democracy requires realm of discursive exchange in which citizens can test their preferences and
produce better collective decisions).
13 See Maxwell McCombs, et. al., Issues in the News and the Public Agenda:  The Agenda-Setting
Tradition, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 281, 292 (Theodore L. Glasser &
passable opinion and actively contributes to shaping a rough consensus regarding what
are the important public issues that need to be addressed.14  Such media agenda-setting
has positive as well as negative ramifications.  In so doing, the mass media narrows the
public agenda to a limited set of resonant issues, which is in some sense antithetical to
expressive diversity.  But on the other hand, public debate in a highly pluralistic,
advanced democratic state cannot proceed without some measure of broad public
consensus on the major priorities of the day.
Agenda-setting also has value for individual self-realization.  We define ourselves
within and against social groups.  For that reason, we generally want to read, see, and
hear at least in part what we think others of our social group are reading, seeing, and
hearing.15  We want to experience cultural events and phenomena jointly with others and
to share a common basis for conversation with our friends and colleagues.  We also want
to know what others think is important, current, and of interest, and to show others in our
social group that we also are “in the know.”  The commercial mass media helps to create
a common culture that can be shared by many, to some extent even across ethnic and
ideological subgroupings.
C.  Trustworthy Supplier of Information
Information has little or no value for either public discourse or individual
autonomy if it is inaccurate.16  Indeed, false and misleading statements of fact can be
highly damaging to liberal democratic governance and individual well-being.
                                                                                                                                                
Charles T. Salmon eds. 1995) [hereinafter PUBLIC OPINION] (noting that given competition among issues
for saliency among the public, the public agenda typically consists of no more than five to seven issues).
14 For further discussion of this point, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic
Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 218, 263-67 (1998). See also Owen M. Fiss, The
Censorship of Television, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1999) (noting that television, unlike today’s
computer communication, has the capacity to create a shared understanding among a mass audience).
15 Cass Sunstein and Edna Ullman-Margalit label as “solidarity goods” those “goods whose value increases
as the number of people enjoying them increases.” Cass Sunstein & Edna Ullman-Margalit, Solidarity in
Consumption, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 98 (2d Series) (April 28, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=224618.
16 As the Supreme Court famously noted in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942):
“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words – those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”.
Trustworthiness and accuracy in the provision of news and information has long
been a central component of journalists’ professional standards.17  Within the mainstream
news media, the provision of “a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the
day’s events” is seen as the most important responsibility of the press,18 and the principle
of objectivity forms the core of the Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional
Journalists.19  In line with those principles, commercial news media devote considerable
resources and professional commitment to checking facts and verifying sources.
D.  The Commercial Media Falls Short of the Fourth Estate Ideal
As numerous critics have pointed out, the commercial media’s actual performance
falls short – some would say “far short” -- of the ideal we have just described. In
performing its watchdog, discourse-enabling, and information-providing functions, the
commercial media skews as well as narrows public debate.  Commercial media, critics
assert, routinely produce bland, uncontroversial expression, designed to put audiences in
a buying mood and to attract a broad cross-section of viewers, readers, and listeners
without unduly offending any of them.20  At the very least, such mainstreaming is
unlikely to provide adequate expression to minority interests and concerns. More
insidiously, it might help to engender a widespread sense of complacency and a
diminished capacity to envision potential challenges to the status quo.21
Part of the reason for media’s failure to live up to the Fourth Estate Ideal, and one
that appears increasingly to be so as media enterprises consolidate into conglomerates
                                                
17 U.S.  journalists’ emphasis on “objectivity” in reporting appears to have had its early beginnings with the
penny presses in the 1830s with their self-announced mission to report the “news” and to have attained
status as ideology and code of professional conduct after the Progressive Era in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.  See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS; A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
NEWSPAPERS (1978).
18 See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL
REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES, AND BOOKS
21 (1947), quoted in Baker, supra note 2, at 348-49.
19 See Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics, available at http://spj.org/ethics/code.htm.
20 See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641,
1641-47 (1967); see also James G. Webster & Patricia F. Phalen, THE MASS AUDIENCE: REDISCOVERING
THE DOMINANT MODEL 101 (1997) (stating that "(m)any contemporary analysts from both ends of the
political spectrum have portrayed the media as inexorably committed to the production of standardized
content").
with non-media corporate parents, is that media enterprise self-interest and concern for
the bottom line pushes coverage to favor commercial interests.22  Media’s skewing also
grows out of market dictate, both real and perceived.  Sensationalism, mainstream
worldview, and reporting that focuses on current political leaders and dominant
institutions sells better to broader audiences than alternative content.23  Moreover, media
exhibit considerable herd behavior, imitating the format of existing commercially
successful movies, books, and TV shows, thus exacerbating the homogenized, uniform
character of much media content.24  In addition, reporters’ dependence on government
officials and prominent, well-organized associations for raw material might also vitiate
the media’s watchdog bite.25  Some commentators claim, indeed, that government
officials exert such a powerful, albeit informal, influence on news coverage and thus on
public perceptions and debate that the notion of autonomous media production and
distribution of ideas is little more than a pipe dream.26
As a result of these factors and others, while the mainstream mass media may often
exhibit moderate-reform-oriented norms, it rarely challenges our basic social, economic,
and political structures.27  Nor, for better or for worse, does it provide a full spectrum of
fathomable expression and opinion.
                                                                                                                                                
21 See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 28-30  (1991) (summarizing the
viewpoint of critical media theorists and other critics that commercial media trivializes political life).
22  See Burt Neuborne, Media Concentration and Democracy: Commentary, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 277,
280.
23 As Ed Baker demonstrates sensationalist violence, and sex sell particularly well across cultures, and thus
assume greater portions of media content as markets for that content become increasingly global.  C. Edwin
Baker, International Trade in Media Products, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-
Koren & Neil Netanel eds. forthcoming 2001).
24 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L. J. 282, 333-34
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 499, 515-16 (2000).
25 See, e.g., Clarice N. Olien, et. al., Conflict, Consensus, and Public Opinion, in PUBLIC OPINION, supra
note 13, at 301, 306 (noting media dependency on power relationships); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting
and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1154-55 (1993).
26 See, e.g., Robert M. Entman, Putting the First Amendment in Its Place: Enhancing American Democracy
Through the Press, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 61, 65-72; Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and
the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L. J. 689, 702-11 (1994).
27 Weinberg, supra note 25, at 1157.  At the same time, critics charge that noncommercial, government-
subsidized media also generally fall well within the mainstream.  See FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 107 (1995) (noting that the BBC’s presentation of public affairs has
generally “limited itself to the boundaries of established political parties”).
III. Political Party-Financed Media
An alternative model to media that depend upon advertising and sales is media
financed in part or in whole by political parties.  Party affiliated newspapers dominated
the American landscape through much of the first half of the nineteenth-century.28  The
party press also played a major role in post-World War II Western Europe.  In recent
decades, however, the European party press, like its nineteenth-century American
counterpart, has significantly diminished in circulation and influence.29
Some commentators lament the passing of an openly ideological, partisan press.30
They surmise that the politically aligned press brought about considerable political
excitement and encouraged higher voting rates and greater citizen participation in
politics.31  Concomitantly, a party press might also sharpen oppositional views and
encourage more robust debate.32  Partisan newspapers in the antebellum United States
would not infrequently launch virulent attacks against newspapers of opposing political
affiliation,33 as well as against newspapers, the forerunners of today’s commercial press,
that charted a more independent course.34  One might imagine as well that an
ideologically driven opposition press would act as a more vigorous watchdog against the
government and party in power than does the commercial media.
Yet, the party press system in the antebellum United States ultimately fell into
disrepute because the parties in power used government patronage to purchase press
                                                
28 Census data taken in 1850 showed that 95% of all U.S. newspapers had a political affiliation.  C. EDWIN
BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 28 (1994), citing HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA, JOURNALISTIC
STANDARDS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 48-49, 114-15 (1989).
29 COUNCIL OF EUROPE PUBLISHING, MEDIA AND ELECTIONS HANDBOOK 11-12 (1999); PETER J.
HUMPHREYS, MEDIA AND MEDIA POLICY IN GERMANY; THE PRESS AND BROADCASTING SINCE 1945, 91
(2nd ed. 1994) (noting that in Germany, “[t]he established political press, with its explicit connection to the
major parties, has all but disappeared”).
30 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 28, at 41-43.
31 Id. at 41, citing MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS 135 (1986).
32 See Baker, supra note 2, at 358-59 (arguing in support of partisan journalism that “[p]articular groups,
especially oppressed groups, … need more segmented or partial dialogues in which to develop their self-
conception and their understanding of their own interests”).
33 See Jason P. Isralowitz, Comment, The  Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and Constitutional
Values, 141 U. PENN. L. REV. 221, 225, 26 (1992) (describing vituperative debate among early American
newspapers, characterized by close ties between editors and party machinery).
34 See SCHUDSON, supra note 17, at 54-57 (describing the 1840 “Moral War” of the New York party press
establishment against the politically fickle, penny-paper upstart, the New York Herald).
loyalty.  By the 1820’s, newspaper editors regularly received government appointments
and subsidies.  Newspapers favored by those in power also received lucrative government
contracts.  These ranged from contracts for printing laws and government documents to
concessions for the supply of twine, printed forms, and wrapping paper for the Post
Office.35  Such patronage brought the press into a corrupt bargain.  It transformed
newspaper editors into “political professionals, people for whom printing was a way to
make a living out of politics, rather than the other way around.”36  As John Quincy
Adams described the alignment of newspapers behind presidential hopeful and then
Adams ally, William Crawford:
The National Intelligencer is secured to him by the belief of the editors
that he will be the successful candidate, and by their dependence upon the
printing of Congress; the Richmond Enquirer because he is a Virginian
and slave-holder; the National Advocate of New York, through Van
Buren, … the Democratic Press, of Philadelphia, because I transferred the
printing of the laws from that paper to the Franklin Gazette; and several
other presses in various parts of the Union upon principles alike selfish
and sordid.37
Opposition politicians railed against such patronage and its accompanying
shackling of the press. They rightly charged that the patronage system transformed the
party press into a “government press” and that at the very least, press liberty is
compromised when “the favor of power is essential to the support of the editors.”38  But
once in power, those critics used the very same tools to reward their loyal supporters and
curry favor with newspapers whose future support they sought.39  It was not until the
Civil War, the establishment of the Government Printing Office, and the emergence of a
                                                
35 See CULVER H. SMITH, THE PRESS, POLITICS, AND PATRONAGE; THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT’S USE OF
NEWSPAPERS 1789-1875 (1977); DONNA LEE DICKERSON, THE COURSE OF TOLERANCE; FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 65-71 (1990).  The government also provided subsidies for the
press on a non-partisan basis.  Beginning soon after Independence, Congress heavily subsidized newspaper
deliveries by imposing preferential postal rates, levying postal charges on subscribers rather than printers,
intermittently collecting subscribers' postal charges, providing free newspaper delivery among printers, and
maintaining postal roads for both post office and printers' private use. Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Press,
Post Office, and Flow of News in the Early Republic, 3 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 255, 257-59 (1983).
36 Jeffrey Lingan Pasley, “Artful and Designing Men”: Political Professionalism in the Early American
Republic, 1775-1820,at 336 (Doctoral Thesis, Oct. 1993).
37 6 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 61 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1874-77; reprinted, Books for
Libraries Press, 1969), quoted in DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 66.
38 Duff Green, U.S. Telegraph, Feb. 9, 1826, quoted in DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 69.
39 See DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 65-71 (describing criticism and subsequent use of press patronage by
John Quincy Adams and Daniel Webster).
strong independent press that party press patronage as an overt federal government policy
came to an end.40
To be certain, the party press patronage system in the antebellum United States
gained momentum as a result of circumstances unique to that time and place.  The high
cost of producing and distributing printed material and the absence of a federal
government printing office led to the federal government’s reliance on the press to print
and distribute government documents and the press’ financial dependence on government
subsidy and patronage.  But the antebellum party press’ susceptibility to government
influence nevertheless presents a cautionary tale.  Even short of systematic patronage,
there are a multitude of ways in which the government can bestow favors upon media
aligned with the party in power, ranging from preferential access to information to subtly
discriminatory regulation.  As a result, at the same time that the party press aligned with
the government will have little incentive to scrutinize government officials and policy,
the opposition press will have reduced ability to act as an effective watchdog.  In
addition, of course, neither government-aligned nor opposition press will have an
incentive to question fundamental components of the political system which benefit all
major political parties.
Finally, at least at its extreme, a party-aligned press can lead to considerable
polarization and insularity.  At least within the mainstream of the political spectrum, the
commercial press presents an exchange of views even while it supports a common
language and understanding for political and social discourse.  The party press might
have the advantage of challenging mainstream assumptions, empowering marginal
voices, and sharpening political debate.  But it can also lead to the fragmentation of
public discourse, a situation in which debate occurs only with the narrow province of
like-minded people.  That in turn can lead not only to insularity, but also to greater
extremism and polarization.
Cass Sunstein has recently surveyed studies in individual and group psychology
documenting the phenomenon of “group polarization.”41  Longstanding democratic
theory holds that group deliberation, the exchange of competing views, produces better
                                                
40 See SMITH, supra note 35, at 229-48.
     41.  Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
outcomes.  But as Sunstein summarizes, when a group consists of individuals with
predeliberation judgments that, on the whole, lean even moderately in a given direction,
deliberation tends to move the group, and the individuals who compose it, toward a more
extreme position.  Thus, with striking empirical regularity, “people who are opposed to
the minimum wage are likely, after talking to each other, to be still more opposed; people
who tend to support gun control are likely, after discussion, to support gun control with
con-siderable enthusiasm; people who believe that global warming is a serious problem
are likely, after discussion, to insist on severe measures to prevent global warming; jurors
who support a high punitive damages award are likely, after talking, to support an award
higher than the median of their predeliberation judgments.”42
In short, while our system of free expression might be enhanced by a resurgence
of ideologically motivated media, the party press system at best supplement, not replace,
independent commercial media.  A party press might provide a welcome antidote to the
mainstream, market-oriented bias of the commercial media.  But it should not be viewed
as a panacea.
IV. Government-Funded Media
Government subsidy provides an opportunity for media to avoid the biases
inherent in reliance on advertising and the market for financial sustenance.  As such
government-funded media can be an important component of the system of free
expression.  They can serve both to engender a public discourse that is not skewed to the
wealthy and provide a forum for minority views that receive little play in commercial
media.  Indeed, in many democratic countries, state-funded television and other media
play important, perhaps even vital, watchdog and discourse-building roles.
However, incidents abound of even democratic governments seeking to use the
power of the purse to extract influence over the speech of state-funded media.  The
problem is not merely the difficulty of setting rational, neutral criteria for the distribution
                                                
42.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization 1 (U. Chi. Law School, John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 91, 1999) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ paper.taf?abstract_id=199668.
of government subsidies to the press.43  In addition, state efforts to insulate state-funded
broadcasters from government and political party interference have proven to be only
partly successful. 44  In some instances, public broadcasters’ internal supervisory organs
have become politicized along party lines.45  In others, governments have exerted direct
pressure on public broadcasters to alter broadcasting content.46
Further, critics charge that noncommercial, government-subsidized media also
generally fall well within the mainstream.47  In part, political pressures constrain public
broadcasters from taking controversial positions or even tackling controversial issues.48
In addition, the people that determine public broadcast programming are largely drawn
from the same intellectual and social élites as their counterparts in the commercial media
and thus tend to share the same mainstream orientation.
V. Peer-to-Peer Model
Yochai Benkler has argued that a system of distributed, peer-to-peer information
production and dissemination would better secure individual autonomy than does our
current commercial-media-dominated regime.49  As Benkler suggests, such a system
would be a much-expanded version of non-centralized, peer-to-peer music exchange
                                                
43 See ANTHONY SMITH, THE POLITICS OF INFORMATION; PROBLEMS OF POLICY IN MODERN MEDIA 174
(1978) (noting that proposals for press subsidies in German have foundered on the difficulty of determining
such criteria).
44 See ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 96-97 (1991) (chronicling decades of post-war French
government attempts to influence coverage on state-run French television and radio); Furore over IRA Film
Could Put Peace Talks in Jeopardy, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 27, 1997, at 1 (noting that under
a United Kingdom government ban, Sinn Fein representatives were not allowed to speak on British
television until 1993); see also Frances H. Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian
Experience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 257-58 (1996) (detailing instances of government censorship in the
supposed “defense of democracy” in post-Soviet Russia); cf. FRANCES STONOR SAUNDERS, THE
CULTURAL COLD WAR; THE CIA AND THE WORLD OF ARTS AND LETTERS (1999)
(documenting the CIA’s covert funding of select academic conferences, magazines, and cultural activities
in post-war Europe in an effort to lure Western European intelligentsia away from its fascination with
Marxism toward a more favorable understanding of the American worldview).
45 See HUMPHREYS, supra note 29, at 176-87.
46 See note 44 supra.
47 See FRANK WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 107 (1995) (noting that the BBC's
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made possible through Gnutella and other such software.50  It would entail the
establishment of a commons for both content and communications infrastructure.  In that
way, all could produce and exchange expressive content, ranging from video to text, free
from governmental or proprietary control.
For Benkler, individual autonomy in the communications environment is best
served when individuals enjoy broad opportunities to disseminate expression – both their
own creative expression and expression that other’s have created – to choose among a
highly diverse menu of expression to hear, see, or read.  The advantage of his peer-to-
peer model is that it takes editorial control away from the commercial firms that currently
own carriage media and expressive content.  It allows individuals to upload, distribute,
and receive the content of their choice.
While Benkler’s focus is individual autonomy, a peer-to-peer model might also be
seen to better serve democratic institutions by providing for greater expressive diversity
and “bottom-up” discourse. Indeed, other commentators have looked to peer-to-peer
communication as a vehicle for “democratizing” our system of free expression.51  As
Niva Elkin-Koren puts it: The “transformative power of cyberspace lies in its capability
to decentralize the production and dissemination of knowledge”.52
VI. Peer-to-Peer; A Critical Evaluation
As I, and others, have argued elsewhere, peer-to-peer communication, such as
takes place on the Internet, raises staggering problems of information overload and
credibility.53  Without some vehicle for filtration and accreditation, individuals would
face the impossible task of sifting through vast quantities of expression to seek to
determine which items are both of interest and reasonably trustworthy.  Without tools and
institutions for filtration and accreditation, we would be awash in a maelstrom of noise.
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Part of the function of the commercial news media is filtration and accreditation.
The press often serves as a source of trustworthiness, stability, and accountability, or at
least some combination of those traits.  Whatever their faults, traditional news media
have the resources and professional commitment to check facts and verify sources, and
we hold them accountable if they do not.  In contrast, Matt Drudge and other individual
online publishers have neither the financial wherewithal nor institutional aspiration to
meet professional journalistic standards.54  That is not to say that such gadflies can make
no constitutive contribution to public discourse or that the media should hold a monopoly
over speech.  But full disintermediation of the kind Benkler and others envision would
not only Balkanize public discourse; it would also leave us without any real possibility
for assessing the reliability and import of vast bulk of expression and opinion swirling
around the Internet.
Benkler well recognizes the need for filtration and accreditation in all
communication, including peer-to-peer networks.55  He argues, however, that peer-to-
peer networks can generate vehicles for filtration and accreditation that will better serve
individual autonomy than filtration and accreditation performed by the commercial news
media.  First, Benkler argues that filtration and accreditation only enhances autonomy if
the editor’s notion of relevance and quality comports with those of the sender and
recipient and if the editor is herself trustworthy.  As he puts it:  “To the extent the values
of the editor diverge from those of the user, an editor does not facilitate user autonomy by
selecting relevant information based on her values, but rather imposes her own
preferences regarding what should be relevant to users.  A parallel effect occurs with
accreditation.  An editor might choose to treat as credible a person whose views or
manner of presentation draw audiences, rather than necessarily the wisest or best
informed commentators.”56  Second, Benkler insists that, armed with the right kind of
communications and processing capabilities, peer-to-peer communication can generate its
own, bottom-up vehicles for relevance and accreditation.57  These would include peer-to-
peer rating systems, such as are possible with music search engines that track and poll
                                                
54 SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 133-36.
55 Benkler, supra note 49, at 105-06.
56 Id. at 107.
57 Id. at 107-08.
user preferences.58  In addition to such peer-to-peer rating and referencing, Benkler and
others suggest, distributed network communication enable persons and entities to
establish competing filtration and accreditation services, giving individuals a broad
spectrum of choice regarding which such “authorities” they wish to rely on.59
I will take Benkler’s arguments in reverse order, first questioning the efficacy of
peer-to-peer filtering and accreditation and then addressing the peer-to-peer model’s
relative benefits for liberal democratic governance.
A. The Efficacy of Peer-to-Peer Filtering and Accreditation
Benkler’s proffered peer-to-peer filtering and accreditation is of two types: peer-
to-peer rating and free lance editing.  Peer-to-peer rating might work well with music and
other art forms.  Music is an “experience good.”  I can tell what a given musical work is
worth to me once I hear it.  I might also be able to know from experience that certain
persons or certain categories of persons share my musical tastes, such that I can generally
rely on their recommendations regarding what music is worth my while to hear.
But the music rating model does not apply to news and other sorts of information.
Information is essentially a “credence good.”60  Consumers have difficulty evaluating the
value of such a good even after consuming it.  Information has value only if it is accurate.
And I generally have no means, short of relying on the trustworthiness of the source of
information, of knowing whether information I receive about an event or phenomenon
outside my personal experience is accurate.  (And, of course, if I have such personal
knowledge, the report of information has no value to me either because I already know
it.)
Peer-to-peer rating over vast communications networks has no mechanism for
ensuring trustworthiness.  How do I know whether a given piece of “information” is
accurate or just rumor, libel, manipulation, or urban legend?  Indeed, even music rating is
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subject to such a problem.  I can rely on my peers’ music rating only to the extent that the
network provides me with accurate information about my peers’ preferences.  But I have
no independent vehicle for judging the accuracy of that information.  How do I know
whether the ratings reflect true preferences or manipulation by certain groups or
musicians, like that which plagues Time Magazine’s Person of the Year poll and other
such online public opinion polls?61  (Ratings reflecting music purchases might solve this
problem, at least to the extent the search engine is trustworthy.  But if music must be
purchased, we might no longer have a non-proprietary information commons.)
Like other situations in which the absence of trustworthiness guarantees results in
a paralysis-inducing collective action problem, peer-to-peer network users might turn to
trusted institutions to provide credible information and trustworthy assessments of others’
information.62  Such institutions would consist of information intermediaries, like Internet
search engines and Consumer Reports, as well competing free lance editors, along the
lines of Benkler’s model.
But as Mark Patterson has demonstrated, it is highly unlikely that trustworthy
information intermediaries would arise to any consistent, systematic extent in the
information commons, peer-to-peer environment.63  Part of the reason stems from the
public goods quality of information.  Information intermediaries provide information
about information produced by others (or aggregate information that the information
intermediary warrants as relevant and credible).  But once information is released,
recipients can pass it on to others at little or no cost.  As a result, unless information
intermediaries can exert proprietary control over their information, which under
Benkler’s information commons model they cannot, they will be unable to profit from all
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the information they produce and thus will likely produce far less information than
socially optimal.64
Even worse, information intermediaries have an incentive to profit from slanting
the information they provide.65  In order to maximize their revenue, information
intermediaries are likely to sell their services to advertisers and information sources,
whether instead of or in addition to selling information to consumers.  That has already
happened with Internet search engines like Yahoo.  Such information intermediaries
regularly sell prominent placement in search results.66  Even so-called “shopping bots,”
specialized search engines designed to compare prices and goods on behalf of consumers,
have been modified to cater to merchants.  Shopping bot sites increasingly offer
merchants opportunities for partnership, affiliation, advertising, and, most insidiously, top
ranking in search results in return for a fee.67
To be certain, information intermediaries face certain reputational constraints.68
But especially where the information concerns the quality and accuracy of news
reporting, consumers of information will likely never determine whether the information
received was accurate.  Given their inability directly to evaluate the quality and
credibility of information intermediary services, consumers will need to rely on the same
mega-filtration and accreditation tools that apply to the commercial mass media.  These
involve some combination of information providers’ professional ethics, which are
already firmly in place in the case of the mass media but which would have to be
developed for their peer-to-peer counterparts, and mega-information intermediaries, who
report on the accuracy of information intermediaries and who suffer from the same
infirmities as any other information intermediary.
Finally, even if commercial, but reasonably credible information intermediaries
do emerge, they are unlikely to do so in a competitive market.  Like all producers of
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information, information intermediaries tend to have cost structures characterized by
economies of scale.  This is especially the case on the Internet, where the marginal cost of
information production is extremely low and fixed costs are extremely high.  As a result,
information industries, online as well as offline, face considerable centripetal force. As
economists have long recognized, “where technology creates significant economies of
scale, markets tend towards dominance by a few large players.”69  The ongoing
consolidations within the media and telecommunications industry are a prime example of
this phenomenon.  And, as Mark Patterson points out, the market for information
intermediaries in the traditional economy also tends strongly towards monopoly.70  There
is no reason to think that peer-to-peer, online networks would somehow spawn a
competitive information intermediary market.
At bottom, the only information intermediaries in the peer-to-peer network world
likely to be different in kind from today’s mass media are non-profit watchdogs.  Such
entities already exist in the offline world.  Some, such as the Consumers Union, are quite
effective in their narrow areas.  But non-profit entities are unlikely to assume the role that
Benkler envisions in the area of news reporting.  Most importantly, the verification of
others’ reporting requires much the same resources as the reporting itself.  And these
resources are considerable.71  Indeed, media critics rightly point out that even the
commercial mass media lack the resources to engage consistently in independent
investigative reporting, without reliance on government sources to provide information.
It is far more costly to track, investigate, and verify ongoing news reporting than to test
the safety and reliability of consumer products.  While non-profit media watchdogs can
sometimes call media news organizations to task for inaccurate and biased reporting, they
lack the resources to do so on a consistent and effective basis.
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B.  Peer-to-Peer’s Relative Benefits for Liberal Democratic Governance
Even if peer-to-peer networks could generate information producers and
intermediaries along the lines Benkler suggests, we would not want to jettison the
commercial mass media.  Benkler, it seems, imagines a two-dimensional speech universe
populated entirely by volunteer individual speakers revolving around a benign
government.72  To my mind, however, liberal democratic governance requires, rather, a
speech universe punctuated by bubbles, a universe that contains concentrations of private
expressive power capable of standing up to government and, indeed, capable of standing
up to General Motors, Mobil Oil, the Republican and Democratic parties, the World
Bank, and other concentrations of private economic and political power.  Democratic
governance requires a free press not just in the sense of a diversity of expression.  It
requires the institution of a free press.  It requires media with the financial wherewithal
and political independence to engage in sustained investigative journalism, to expose the
errors and excesses of government and other powerful political and economic actors.
The Benklerian republic of yeoman speakers presupposes a republic of yeomen,
period.  It imagines a world in which we earn our livings, communicate, and govern
ourselves without mediating organizations and concentrations of wealth and power.  But
that is not our world, never has been our world, and, so long as we are organized in
polities larger than the Greek city-state, never will be our world.  In fact, I dare say, it is
not a world to which we should aspire because in such a world, nothing would stand
between the individual and an all-powerful state.
Our best hope for democratic governance in this world is far messier than the
ideal republic of yeomen.  It requires mediating institutions and associations, private and
public concentrations of wealth and power, and varied mechanisms to maintain multiple
balances of power within government, within civil society, and between government and
civil society.73  No less, it requires an expressive sector that mirrors that panoply of
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governing institutions.  It requires independent, powerful media to guard against abuses
of power on the part of other private and governmental entities.  It also requires
mechanisms to check and distribute the power of the commercial media.
Individual authors and web site operators lack the resources to fulfill the press'
traditional, vital role of watchdog against government myopia and oppression.  Nor can
individuals adequately expose corporate unlawfulness, labor union corruption, and
political party self-aggrandizement.  Liberal democratic nations necessarily encompass
multiple concentrations of power.74  Only an equally powerful press can effectively check
other entities' and associations' deployment of their power by exposing it to the light of
public opinion.  Indeed, only a mass media, capable of reaching a mass audience, can
both catalyze and, to a degree, embody public opinion in the face of government
authority and corporate fiefdom.
The story of former tobacco company researcher Jeffrey Wigand is a case in
point.75  While employed at cigarette-maker Brown & Williamson, Wigand discovered
that, despite repeated public denials and testimony under oath to the contrary, leading
tobacco company executives had long known that the nicotine in cigarettes is an
addictive substance.  In 1995 Wigand relayed his discovery to a reporter for the widely
watched CBS news magazine, 60 Minutes, and agreed to be interviewed on the program.
In so doing, Wigand violated his Brown & Williamson non-disclosure agreement and
undertook considerable financial and personal risk.  Instrumental in Wigand’s decision to
divulge the tobacco company misdeeds despite that risk was CBS’s promise to indemnify
him for any liability to his former employer and, no less importantly, the knowledge that
he would have the opportunity to present his findings before millions of prime time
television viewers.76  It is highly unlikely that Wigand would have exposed Brown &
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Williamson at his own peril without the backing and mass audience of a major media
outlet.  And even if he had, perhaps by posting information and documents on his
personal web page, his story may well have been lost in the chorus of tobacco company
denials (if they had even bothered to respond) and against the backdrop of tens of
thousands of crank web pages presenting asundry allegations that few find credible even
when true.
Of course, there is more to the Wigand story.  CBS management initially scuttled
the Wigand interview shortly before it was to appear on 60 Minutes.  Apparently, CBS
did want to take the unlikely, but not immaterial risk of having to pay a multi-billion
dollar damage award to Brown & Williamson, especially since that contingency would
have reduced CBS’s share price at a time when the company was negotiating to be
acquired by Westinghouse.  Additional, and more insidious, corporate entanglements
might have also contributed to the decision.77  Laurence Tisch, CBS's chairman at the
time, was also an owner of Lorillard Tobacco Company, and his son Andrew was
Lorillard's president.  In fact, Andrew Tisch was one of the tobacco executives who had
sworn before Congress that nicotine was not addictive, and Wigand was a witness in the
perjury investigation regarding that testimony.78 At that time, moreover, Lorillard was
negotiating with Brown & Williamson to buy six of its brands.79  In sum, CBS’s
broadcast of the Wigand interview might have caused CBS and Laurence Tisch
considerable financial loss and might have helped send Tisch’s son to jail, facts that
could hardly have been lost on the CBS lawyers and executives involved in the decision
to cancel the Wigand broadcast.80
The circumstances surrounding CBS’s cancellation of the Wigand interview
graphically illustrate the potential vulnerabilities and limitations of the media-as-
watchdog model, especially in an age of increasing media consolidation and
conglomeration.  But some three months after the Wigand interview was to have been
aired, CBS reversed its decision to scuttle the interview and did in fact broadcast it; and
in so doing, it dealt a significant blow to the tobacco industry.  Significantly, it was the
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presence and coverage of competing media that pushed a reluctant CBS into reasserting
its watchdog role.  CBS broadcast the Wigand interview only after the New York Times
had detailed CBS’s capitulation in a front page story,81 the New York Daily News had
obtained and reported on the transcript of the omitted interview,82 and the Wall Street
Journal had published Wigand deposition testimony containing his central allegations.83
Moreover, critical media coverage did not end with the CBS broadcast.  Most notably
perhaps, in its 1999 motion picture, The Insider, Disney/ABC presented a widely-
acclaimed dramatized version of the entire Wigand episode, castigating CBS for the
network’s striking, if temporary, abdication of its journalistic integrity. That
contemporaneous and subsequent coverage by competing media enterprises, an instance
of such enterprises exposing each other’s wrongdoing, may deter such lapses in the
future.
The moral I wish to draw from this story is not that “all’s well that ends well,”
that we can complacently rely on an increasingly conglomeratized mass media to expose
corporate wrongdoing.   Rather, the Wigand story illustrates that, like a host of
governmental and private institutions, media power has both a positive and negative face.
There are no perfect solutions to this dual face of power.  There are only partial solutions,
most involving efforts to balance one power center against one or more others.  State
subsidies for non-commercial media, state-imposed limitations on media firm
conglomeration, and state assurance of individual access to effective channels of
communication constitute such partial solutions.  These measures aim to provide for
greater expressive diversity without undermining the media's constitutive force.  They are
not perfect solutions.  They leave considerable market hierarchy in place, rendering us
vulnerable to media co-option and market suppression of minority voices.  But such
measures, and others like them, are the best that we can or should hope to obtain.  To
wipe out the power of the commercial media would simply throw out the proverbial baby
with the bath water.
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Conclusion
Our system of expression should include considerable space for decentralized,
individual expression, such as on the Internet.  In addition to constituting a vast forum for
alternative discourses, the Internet spawns gadflies, media critics and others may
sometimes successfully bring a story to mass media attention or challenge media
silence.84  But that is not to say that we should aspire, even as a liberal democratic ideal,
to an egalitarian expressive universe composed entirely of virtual and street-corner
pamphleteers.  Rather, our system of free expression must include a plurality of speaker
types, including commercial mass media, government-subsidized noncommercial media,
independent publishers, political and nonprofit associations, universities, and individuals.
To some extent, each of these speaker types offsets, complements, and checks the rest.
Like other speaker types, the commercial media plays a unique and vital role within this
complex mix.
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